Although the author of the theory of such conflicts was wrong, believing that Ukraine and Russia, given Orthodoxy and some other cultural kinship, will be allies, not enemies.
In 1996, political scientist Samuel Huntington proposed several strong statements about the post-Cold War world. He argued that global politics had become not just “multipolar” but “multi-civilizational.” Because rival forces are modernizing according to different cultural lines, not just trying to integrate with the liberal West.
The “balance of power among civilizations” has changed, and the West has begun to enter a period of “relative decline.” A world order based on “civilizations” was born. And in it, “culturally related” societies tend to unite in alliances or blocs. The universalism of the West, according to Huntington, laid the groundwork for conflict with other civilizations, in particular with China and the Islamic world.
According to Ross Dautat in an article for the New York Times , all the above statements were the main theses of Huntington's book “The Battle of Civilizations and the Restructuring of the World Order.” This work became an alternative to the thesis of the “end of history” expressed by the philosopher and economist Francis Fukuyama. He argued that after the Cold War, societies would begin to move toward a model of liberal democracy. Against the background of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Huntington's thesis, it would seem, should have received new attention, given the consolidated reaction of the West, as well as the fluctuations of China and India. But Huntington is more often mentioned in conversations that Putin is seeking a conflict of civilizations. And you can't give it to him. Or that Russia's attempt to revive “Greater Russia” just refutes the political theory of the political scientist.
For example, the latter was recently insisted on by the French researcher of Islam Olivier Rua during an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur. He called the war in Ukraine “unequivocal proof that the theory of the” battle of civilizations “does not work.” Because, according to Huntington, Orthodox countries should not be at war with each other. But right now Putin is waging war against his Orthodox neighbor. And, by the way, this is not the first time.
In an article for Compact magazine, which has become a favorite publication of left and right radicals, Christopher Caldwell, a senior fellow at the Clermont Institute, also pointed out that Huntington's assessments of Orthodox unity were wrong. But he also suggested another reason to reject the idea of a “conflict of civilizations,” suggesting that such a model could well explain the previous 20 years. But recently, the world has returned to an ideological confrontation in which Western elites preach neoliberalism and various regimes and movements try to resist.
The author believes that this is the “right” interpretation of the global political landscape, hostile to Western missionary zeal. But Caldwell's analysis is also reminiscent of the popular liberal thesis that the world is increasingly divided between liberalism and authoritarianism, between democracy and autocracy. And it does not have many poles and hostile civilizations. However, both theses offer worse explanations of events than the one formulated by Huntington. No theory 25-30 years ago can perfectly interpret world events.
“But Huntington's thesis is best suited to understanding the direction of global politics,” he said.
To understand why, we can recall the years when the book on the “battle of civilizations” was published. The new century has just begun. In the United States, there was the George W. Bush administration, which was about to give way to Barack Obama's team. At the time, Huntington's analysis was often recalled to explain the rise of terrorism, linking it to “Islamic resistance” to Western power. But by that time, in all other parts of the world, his thesis seemed relatively weak. The United States did not show an obvious decline. China has integrated with the Western world and liberalized to some extent without trying to pursue a civilizational course.
During Vladimir Putin's first presidential term, Russia seemed to seek an alliance with America and Europe, as well as maintaining a certain democratic normality. In India, the forces of Hindu nationalism have not yet formed. Even in the Muslim world, there have been many moments, from the Green Movement in Iran to the Arab Spring, that have promised to replicate the momentum of the 1989 democratic revolutions. The first years of the 21st century, in other words, provided ample evidence of the universal appeal of Western capitalism, liberalism, and democracy. The outspoken opposition to these models was very marginal and was limited to Islamist groups, left-wing critics of globalization and the DPRK government.
The last decade, on the other hand, has made Huntington's predictions about the diversity of civilization more obvious. It is not just that US power has clearly diminished compared to rivals and enemies, or that American attempts to spread democracy by brute force after 9/11 have failed. Specific differences between the great powers began to correspond to the laws of civilization described by Huntington.
China's one-party meritocracy, Putin's uncrowned tsarism and the triumph of dictatorships after the Arab Spring in the Middle East, and populism in India are all forms of “autocracy” that are still fragmented. But at the same time, it is a clear cultural change, in line with Huntington's typology, his notion that the heritage of civilization will manifest itself with a reduction in Western influence.
What about the war in Ukraine according to the “conflict of civilizations” model? Well, it must be admitted here that Huntington made mistakes in his predictions. His expectations that civilizational tendencies prevail over national ones did not come true. After all, the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine is no less fiercely fighting Putin's troops, despite cultural kinship. This example corresponds to a larger pattern. No non-Western great power has so far built a great alliance on the basis of civilizational kinship. This means that the third and fourth predictions of the political scientist still have the weakest view to date. For example, he expected China to be able to integrate Taiwan peacefully or even bring Japan into its sphere of influence. Such a scenario now seems unlikely. Meanwhile, smaller countries that are “torn” between the liberal West and alternative civilizations tend to choose an alliance from the United States rather than Russia or China.
This speaks to the enduring appeal of the West, America's ability to maintain its advantages even in a multipolar world. But this does not mean that liberalism can return to its dominant position, which it held at the height of American power. All the ambiguous and weak reactions to Putin's war outside the Euro-Atlantic area do not promise the establishment of a unified liberal international order soon. Although some aspects of Fukuyama's end-of-history theory have spread beyond the liberal West, they have often distorted his views on the idealism of democracy and human rights.
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